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By most objective standards, the intelligence-sector reform that has
taken place in South Africa since the end of apartheid seems to be a
model success. Not only have the intelligence services gone from being
militarized, highly repressive instruments of internal control to being
seemingly transparent and democratically accountable civilian-led agen-
cies designed to inform policy, but they have done so in a systematic
manner that conforms to the policy prescriptions and theories of experts
in the field of democratic transformation. From a theoretical standpoint,
South Africa’s transformation process is a political scientist’s dream
come true: Models were adapted to policy prescriptions, which in turn
were codified into law and then operationalized as new structures and
procedures. One can study where the South African intelligence sector
stood during the apartheid era, discern how the transformation process
was designed and implemented, and analyze the tangible results of these
reforms on the intelligence sector.
What remains to be seen is whether the transformation process has
realized the high standards set by the reformers, and how their reforms
have affected the intelligence agencies’ effectiveness. A decade into
the transformation process, the long-term impacts of these reforms re-
main uncertain, but several trends are becoming evident. To grasp the
whole picture, however, some background is needed.
With its peculiar heritage and the dramatic transformation that it has
undergone, South Africa presents a vivid picture of both intelligence
abuses and the determination to bring intelligence under democratic
control. South Africa’s intelligence apparatus had its roots in the armed
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forces and law enforcement. Many of the security-intelligence agen-
cies1 are descended from the Special Branch of the South African Police
(SAP). From the beginning of the apartheid era in 1948, their main goal
was to gather intelligence relating to internal-security threats posed by
liberation movements, especially the African National Congress (ANC).
The regime viewed the ANC as the gravest threat and as a body under
Soviet control. This perception was enhanced by the Cold War interna-
tional climate and the influence of the Afrikaner doctrine of Christian
Nationalism internalized by both the ruling elites and the security of-
ficers who served them. Throughout the apartheid era, national-security
policy focused primarily on combating the ANC and other communist-
supported groups, whether inside the country or in neighboring states.
As internal and external resistance to apartheid increased and the
threat of Soviet expansion in Africa grew, the intelligence agencies ex-
panded in size and power. Officers from the SAP’s Security Branch (SB)
were seconded to the national civilian intelligence organizations, the
Republican Intelligence and its successors, the Bureau for State Security
(BOSS), the Department of National Security, and later the National In-
telligence Service (NIS). These internal-security intelligence services
and the Department of Military Intelligence were responsible for col-
lecting, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence, as well as conduct-
ing counterintelligence operations. Over time, elements of the Depart-
ment of Information, the Foreign Affairs Ministry, the Railways Police
Security Branch, and the Prisons Service also took up intelligence tasks.2
Military officers seconded to internal-security–intelligence duties
dominated this security-intelligence apparatus. These “securocrats,” as
they became known, flourished under the P.W. Botha administration
(1975–89), and the internal-security intelligence structures that they op-
erated became the primary institutions which the National Party govern-
ment used to maintain white-minority rule. The State Security Council
(SSC), established in 1972, coordinated strategic intelligence policy un-
der the chairmanship of the prime minister (known after 1984 as the state
president) and included key cabinet ministers as well as senior military,
intelligence, and police officials. The influence that the South African
Defense Force (SADF) wielded over the SSC could be seen from the cus-
tom of naming generals with clandestine experience to the key post of
SSC secretary-general. The SSC developed a “Total Strategy” to defeat
the ANC through a mixture of welfare and security measures administered
by a National Security Management System (NSMS) that reached into
hundreds of neighborhoods, townships, and villages across South Africa.3
Policing and Praetorians
When Defense Minister P.W. Botha became president in 1975, the
SADF gained in prominence and its Directorate of Military Intelligence
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(DMI) became the dominant intelligence agency, assuming responsibil-
ity for clandestine and covert operations from BOSS. Counterintelligence
fell under the Police Security Branch. The DMI and SADF special forces
mounted extensive covert operations against the liberation movements
in both South Africa itself and the neighboring “frontline states.”4 Un-
der Botha, right-wing “securocrats” from the DMI became the Praetorian
Guards of the apartheid regime.
In modern liberal democracies, domestic security intelligence is usu-
ally a “high-policing” function assigned to a civilian agency such as
the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the United States or the Security
Service (MI5) in the United Kingdom. This was not the case in apart-
heid-era South Africa, where, as in most authoritarian regimes, the bound-
aries and functions of military-intelligence and police organizations
overlapped and became indistinguishable from each other. The milita-
rized security-intelligence services functioned more as “political po-
lice” than as “domestic intelligence bureaus” subject to ministerial con-
trol and legislative and judicial oversight. 5 Under Botha, they acquired
greater autonomy from policy makers and became insulated from most
legislative or judicial scrutiny. As the SADF and its DMI became more
influential, they tended to be responsive to, and derived their powers
and responsibilities from, the executive authority of the president and
the SSC rather than legal mandates. The militarized security organs gath-
ered political intelligence on thousands of people, usually related to
subversion rather than specific criminal offenses. The DMI became the
regime’s chief weapon against political opposition and as such was a
bulwark of white-minority rule.
By the time that President Botha’s health failed and Frederik W. de
Klerk replaced him in 1989, the military-dominated intelligence ser-
vices had come to resemble an “independent security state” free of
external controls on its activities. Unlike political police, who act at the
behest of the rulers, an independent security state in effect sets its own
agenda and may pursue goals other than those that the ruling elite wishes
to pursue. Its funding and policies remain hidden from anyone outside
the organization itself, which selects whatever targets it pleases for its
information-gathering and countering activities. All these characteris-
tics were present in the South African intelligence apparatus during
apartheid’s last decade.
As president, de Klerk was determined to bring this military-domi-
nated independent security state under control in order to advance his
political agenda of normalization, beginning with the lifting of a na-
tionwide state of emergency dating to 1986 and the unbanning of the
ANC and other opposition groups. Consequently, de Klerk moved to
diminish the power of the NSMS by subordinating it to the NIS and
placing it, along with the SSC staff, under civilian Deputy Information
Minister Roelf Meyer.
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Making the civilian-run NIS South Africa’s premier intelligence or-
ganization was a key to ending the military preeminence established
under Botha. Shaun McCarthy argues that during the last years of the
apartheid era under de Klerk, the NIS “remained the most enlightened
and least controversial” of the South African intelligence agencies.
Botha’s uniformed securocrats had given the NIS little active role in
their covert campaign against the ANC, and the NIS was the intelli-
gence agency most favorable toward political rather than military solu-
tions. The NIS helped to make possible the early contacts between de
Klerk’s administration and ANC leaders. Robert Henderson maintains
that de Klerk, first as a minister and member of the SSC under Botha,
then later as president, both helped to shape intelligence requirements
and shared in responsibility for the covert operations targeting the ANC
and other organizations opposed to the apartheid regime.6 However that
may be, it is clear that once he became president, de Klerk tried to make
the security-intelligence apparatus more accountable to his office, only
to find that it had taken on the characteristics of an independent secu-
rity state.
As apartheid waned during the early 1990s, de Klerk struggled to
enact intelligence reform, only to find that secret units with hidden
funding sources defied government control and oversight. The presi-
dent was plagued by revelations of violent “Third Force” operations
run by a network of former and current security operatives acting with-
out official sanction. While some stories about these rogue elements
came out as a result of court proceedings, South Africa’s media had
since the later Botha years played a significant role in exposing dubi-
ous intelligence activities. While embarrassing stories sometimes
undermined de Klerk’s negotiating position, the absence of effective
legislative oversight left the media as the provider of the only real, even
if sensationalized, intelligence oversight in South Africa.
The New Dispensation
With ANC leader Nelson Mandela’s election as president of the Gov-
ernment of National Unity (GNU) in April 1994, South Africa entered a
period of momentous transition that included the integration, reorien-
tation, and reorganization of the intelligence and security sectors.
Although the GNU included ministers from the National Party (includ-
ing de Klerk as second vice-president) and the Inkatha Freedom Party
(IFP), all the security portfolios (Defense, Safety and Security, Intelli-
gence, Justice, and Foreign Affairs) were in ANC hands. This would
have a profound effect on the future shape and course of the new South
African intelligence community. The integration of the intelligence
and security sectors would be the most daunting task.7
Discussions in 1993 between NIS and the ANC’s Department of In-
Kenneth R. Dombroski 47
telligence and Security (DIS) led to proposals during the tenure of the
Transitional Executive Council (TEC) in early 1994 for legislation to
transform the intelligence apparatus once the new GNU came to power.
Recognizing that merely integrating the intelligence and security ser-
vices would not necessarily do away with the independent security state
that had grown up, the TEC’s Sub-Council on Intelligence developed
principles and guidelines to shape new laws and a new organizational
structure. The guidelines sprang from an earlier set published in the
ANC’s Annual National Conference report of 1992. They reflected the
desire to adhere to democratic principles and transparency and speci-
fied that the new intelligence community would be organized and
governed by new legal mandates and would be subject to a code of
conduct as well as held accountable by legislative oversight.8
In developing a new intelligence “dispensation,” the Sub-Council
on Intelligence and GNU legislators and policy makers looked to the
models of the British, Canadian, and Australian intelligence communi-
ties. The South Africans closely studied the Canadian Security
Intelligence Service Act and the Australian Security Intelligence Act
and adapted several of the organizational-structure, executive-control,
and parliamentary-oversight features of both in their new intelligence
legislation. The Canadians had been particularly concerned with issues
of public accountability, while limiting the scope of the oversight pro-
cess to avoid politicization of the intelligence community. The U.S.
and British models apparently were viewed less favorably due to per-
ceived problems in legislative oversight.9 Considering the lack of
effective legislative oversight under apartheid, it was only prudent for
the GNU to make the institutionalization of such oversight a priority in
the area of intelligence reform.
After taking office in May 1994, the GNU followed through on the
TEC’s efforts toward comprehensive intelligence reform with a White
Paper on Intelligence that outlined the “philosophy, mission and role of
intelligence in a democratic South Africa,” with a “focus primarily on
the mandates of the proposed new civilian services (domestic and for-
eign).”10 In late 1994, the GNU passed the Intelligence Services Act
creating the civilian National Intelligence Agency (NIA) and the South
African Secret Service (SASS) to replace the existing apartheid-era ser-
vices. The National Strategic Intelligence Act, passed at the same time,
defined the functions of the national intelligence agencies and created
a National Intelligence Coordinating Committee to replace the NIS,
while another act created intelligence-oversight mechanisms. Later, the
1995 South African Police Services Act and the 1996 National Crime
Prevention Strategy would address aspects of security intelligence per-
taining to the police.
Because the interim constitution dealt with police and military re-
structuring but not intelligence overhaul, the White Paper on Intelligence
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became the key document for outlining the overarching philosophy,
organizational structure, legal mandates, control and oversight mecha-
nisms, code of conduct, and future policies for the new South African
intelligence community. According to the White Paper, this commu-
nity would be governed by principles such as: political neutrality;
legislative sanction, accountability, and parliamentary control; a bal-
ance between secrecy and transparency; and the separation of intelligence
from policy making.  In addition, members of the intelligence services
would be required to follow an ethical code of conduct that called for:
allegiance to the constitution and other democratic institutions; subor-
dination to the rule of law; compliance with democratic values;
adherence to the principle of political neutrality; commitment to integ-
rity, objectivity, and unbiased evaluation of information; and promotion
of mutual trust between policy makers and intelligence professionals.
The White Paper also contained language that severely limited the
use of covert operations both internally and externally. The 1996
postapartheid constitution stipulated the governing principles of the
intelligence services as compliance with the rule of law (including in-
ternational law), civilian executive control vested in the president,
legislative regulation and oversight, transparency and accountability,
political neutrality, and the duty of intelligence-service members to
disobey illegal orders.11
The GNU set about consolidating the intelligence community by
integrating the former apartheid regime’s intelligence and security ap-
paratus with its counterparts from both the black homelands and the
ANC’s DIS. Before 1990, the ANC’s intelligence apparatus had included
directorates for counterintelligence and strategic intelligence analysis,
as well as the military-intelligence wing of Umkhonto we Sizwe (“Spear
of the Nation” or MK), the ANC’s military arm. Besides being bitter
enemies, the organizations that the GNU was trying to meld together
had differing ideologies, core competencies, operating procedures, and
experiences. The existing South African intelligence services were
tainted by their role as apartheid’s guardians. The ANC services, trained
by the Soviets and their clients, were rooted in unconventional warfare
and were unaccustomed to performing the various tasks and functions
required of sophisticated national intelligence agencies in a liberal de-
mocracy. The homeland intelligence and security services were a mixed
bag of former lower-ranking SB and SADF members known for corrup-
tion. To the ANC, they seemed like nothing but an extension of the
apartheid state.12
Current Structures
The South African intelligence community developed during the GNU
period up through President Thabo Mbeki’s reelection in 2004 re-
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sembled, with modifications, the British, Canadian, and Australian mod-
els. Executive control is vested in the president and passes through the
Cabinet Committee for Security and Intelligence Affairs to the Ministry
for Intelligence Services. The two civilian intelligence agencies, the
NIA and SASS, are under the Minister of Intelligence. The NIA is charged
with domestic intelligence and counterintelligence missions (similar to
Britain’s MI5), while the SASS conducts foreign intelligence activities
(similar to MI6). The president appoints the directors of both agencies.
Military intelligence under the South African National Defence Force
(SANDF) is separate and distinct from the civilian agencies. Within the
South African Police Service (SAPS), the Crime Intelligence Division
conducts criminal intelligence. Coordination between these agencies is
handled by the National Intelligence Coordinating Committee (NICOC),
which consists of the intelligence coordinator—appointed by, and ac-
countable to, the president—and the coordinator’s staff as well as the
top official from each intelligence agency.
The Parliament’s Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence sees to
legislative oversight. The committee has powers to conduct investiga-
tions of intelligence-community activities, make recommendations on
intelligence-related legislation, and control the accounts and financial
statements of the intelligence services. An inspector-general for intelli-
gence, appointed by two-thirds of the legislature, is authorized to have
considerable access to intelligence information in order to conduct in-
vestigations and report to the Joint Standing Committee. The
auditor-general and Standing Committee on Public Accounts monitor
the intelligence budgets. In addition, a public protector and the Human
Rights Commission provide additional protections from abuse of state
power.13 Judicial oversight is exercised primarily as a check on execu-
tive control over the legality of intelligence operations and through the
resolution of legal actions brought against the government.
There are several other bodies that belong in this account. A Na-
tional Security Council (NSC) was established in June 2000, and consists
of the president, the deputy president, and the ministers of Safety and
Security, Defense, Intelligence, Foreign Affairs, Home Affairs, Finance,
and Justice, with other ministries participating as needed. The NSC’s
main jobs are to develop national-security policy and to ensure that
cabinet committees coordinate around that policy. Nonstatutory and
not a feature of the GNU, the Council seems designed to move the mak-
ing of national-security policy out of the larger cabinet orbit. In addition
to the NSC, there are interdepartmental Joint Operational and Intelli-
gence Structures (Joints) that date to 1999 and link the NIA, SASS,
SANDF, SAPS, and other government agencies in order to deal with
internal-security issues.
The Ministry for Intelligence Services came into being in 1996 as
the main office for the formulation of intelligence policy. Charged with
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guiding and directing the arduous intelligence-transformation process,
the ministry is the executive office for civilian intelligence and per-
forms the community-management function. A 1998 law puts the
intelligence minister in charge of ensuring effective cooperation be-
tween the civilian intelligence services (NIA and SASS), SANDF, and
the SAPS, in consultation with their ministers. Intelligence priorities for
the ministry include: combating subversion, sabotage, terrorism, cor-
ruption, crime, and arms smuggling; conducting counterespionage;
addressing domestic protective-security problems, regional security is-
sues, stability issues in Africa, and international economic and
technological threats directed at South Africa; preventing involvement
of private security companies in African conflicts; and ensuring safety
during local elections.
The intelligence coordinator and NICOC staff handle day-to-day co-
ordination between the national intelligence agencies. The NICOC also
produces and disseminates national strategic intelligence products to
the president, the cabinet, the Cabinet Committee for Security and In-
telligence Affairs, and other clients within the national and provincial
governments. The NICOC has established Provincial Intelligence Coor-
dination Committees (PICOCs) in the nine provinces and created several
functional committees to facilitate coordination below the national level.
The existence of provincial-level structures somewhat parallels the old
NSMS, with the major difference that the postapartheid system is not
dominated by the military.
In October 2001, the NIA created a Presidential Support Unit (PSU).
Originally, it was designed to give the presidency logistical and sup-
port services such as secure communications and countermeasures
against electronic surveillance when the president travels, but it has
evolved into a 300-member unit with an official mandate to advise the
presidency on strategies for conflict prevention, management, and reso-
lution. The PSU is not supposed to collect intelligence itself.14  However,
the PSU’s actual functions remain murky, and there are indications that
it has become Mbeki’s personal intelligence service.
The NIA, created by amalgamating the former NIS with DIS and the
homeland intelligence services, is mandated by the National Strategic
Intelligence Act of 1994 to gather, correlate, evaluate, and analyze do-
mestic intelligence in order to identify any threat or potential threat to
the security of South Africa, and to supply intelligence regarding such
threats to the NICOC; to fulfill the national counterintelligence respon-
sibility; to provide, where necessary, intelligence to the South African
Police Service (SAPS) for the purposes of investigating alleged offences;
and to gather and evaluate intelligence at the request of other interested
departments of the government.
According to its legal mandate, the NIA’s domestic-intelligence du-
ties include: 1) threat indications and warnings; 2) analysis and
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monitoring of crises with a view to identifying “opportunities for the
government”; 3) the national counterintelligence function, including
offensive counterespionage; and 4) a departmental intelligence respon-
sibility to offer help and liaison to other government departments
requiring intelligence. The NIA also conducts security investigations,
vets intelligence personnel and others for access to classified informa-
tion, provides internal protective security and information-technology
security for the government, develops security-standards policy, and
assists other departments with the government’s anticorruption cam-
paign. The NIA has no law-enforcement powers, but does support SAPS
with intelligence as needed and authorized. In 2000, the NIA underwent
a further reorganization (probably related to the forming of the PICOCs)
aimed at decentralizing intelligence activities into the provinces in
order better to focus on domestic-security threats.
The mission of the Secret Service is to gather, evaluate, and analyze
foreign intelligence (excluding foreign military intelligence) and to con-
duct counterintelligence operations outside the country. The SASS re-
ceived the “cream of the crop” of personnel from the old NIS and DIS.
Despite this, the SASS intelligence products reportedly are not held in
high regard by Mbeki, which may account for the formation of the PSU.
Counterespionage is likely to be a priority function for the Secret Service.
Tackling the Crime Problem
The South African Police Service (SAPS) reports to the Ministry of
Safety and Security and is the primary domestic-security service. It is a
national force, with approximately 149,000 personnel (including 33,000
civilians) spread across all nine provinces. During the transformation
period, it faced a significant problem with personnel competency, since
an estimated one-fourth of police officers were functionally illiterate.
Insufficient and low-quality personnel, corruption in the service, low
morale, and frequent murders of police officers remained problems within
the force for years. Crime remains a serious national-security problem in
South Africa, and the SAPS is on the front line of the government’s
National Crime Combating Strategy (NCCS) campaign to stabilize crime
rates, particularly in designated “hot spots.” The Directorate of Special
Operations, better known as “the Scorpions,” is the leading SAPS crime-
fighting unit, reportedly modeled on the FBI.
The Crime Intelligence Division (CID) of the SAPS is responsible for
collecting and analyzing crime intelligence as well as counterintelli-
gence related to criminal matters, and for providing intelligence and
technical support to crime-prevention and investigative efforts. Crime
Intelligence is the fastest growing program in the Safety and Security
budget. The CID has been involved in cross-border operations such as
Operation Rachel in Mozambique, which focused on the destruction of
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arms caches. To support the NCCS, the division is shifting its emphasis
from reactive to proactive intelligence designed to detect suspected
criminal activities before a crime has been committed. The Crime Intel-
ligence Division does conduct covert actions, and is regulated by the
constitution, the SAPS Act of 1995, the National Strategic Intelligence
Act of 1994, the Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Act of 1992,
and the White Paper on Intelligence. While not militarized or integrated
into the security-intelligence network to the degree seen during the
apartheid era, the SAPS does have representatives in the Joints and
PICOCs, and its minister sits on the NSC. The commissioner of the
Crime Intelligence Division represents the SAPS on the NICOC.
In the transformation of South Africa’s intelligence sector, demilita-
rization has been a key goal. By dismantling the “securocrat” structure,
creating a civilian-led Defense Department, and limiting the scope of
military intelligence to the functions specified in the 1994 National
Strategic Intelligence Act, the GNU and its successor, an ANC-IFP coa-
lition government, achieved that goal. The Act limits Defense Intelli-
gence (or DI, formerly the Military Intelligence Division) to collecting,
correlating, evaluating, and using foreign and domestic military intelli-
gence, and conducting counterintelligence within the SANDF. The DI
is banned from collecting nonmilitary intelligence and from covert col-
lection except under specific circumstances limited by law, and only
when authorized by the national intelligence coordinator with the con-
currence of the NICOC and cabinet. The DI is forbidden from participat-
ing in any operations not related to intelligence, and the SANDF as a
whole has no powers of arrest, detention, or search and seizure under the
new constitution. Yet the DI is involved in supporting the two highest-
priority Defense Department missions: controlling the borders and co-
operating with SAPS for internal security. Neither SAPS nor the SANDF
is at ease with what amounts to military involvement in police func-
tions, but until SAPS can show itself able to tackle these jobs alone, the
SANDF will remain a major player in internal security. Oversight of the
DI is shared between the mechanisms designed for the intelligence com-
munity and an inspector-general for defense intelligence.
So far, we have discussed formal legal and institutional changes and
the redrawing of organizational charts. These matter, but are hardly the
whole story. Since the creation of the ANC-IFP ruling coalition and
Thabo Mbeki’s election to the presidency as Mandela’s successor in
1999, subtle but significant changes have come to the intelligence com-
munity. Not all of these bode well for the high standards set by the new
laws and constitution. Above all, Mbeki’s placement of old comrades
from the ANC’s former intelligence network into virtually every key
security-sector position has worried some observers.
 Moreover, the extent of effective intelligence oversight has become
a concern. The post of inspector-general of intelligence lacks a clear
Kenneth R. Dombroski 53
role or set of reporting channels, and has remained mostly vacant for the
last decade. One recent incumbent, Fazel Randera, resigned in January
2002 after only six months on the job. While he cited personal grounds
for leaving, reports indicate that his real reason was the untenability of
having to confront an intelligence community with close ties to the
presidency. Mangosuthu Buthelezi, the IFP leader and former home-
affairs minister, has questioned whether oversight is truly independent
and has said that top ANC figures are “untouchable.”15
Amendments to the intelligence acts were enacted in 2002. While
some of the new provisions clarified ambiguities in the earlier laws,
critics saw signs in the amendment package that the government was
moving to make the intelligence services less transparent and account-
able to parliamentary and judicial oversight.16 While Mbeki and his
lieutenants would no doubt not welcome the comparison, the NSC and
the new Presidential Support Unit have been starting to look and func-
tion more like the old apartheid regime’s Cabinet Committee for State
Security and its subordinate SSC. If this trend continues and the secu-
rity-intelligence sector begins to backslide into a “political police”
mode of operation, owing its allegiance to Mbeki and the ANC rather
than the constitution, South Africa’s democratization process will be
in jeopardy. In time—perhaps with a change of generations—a new
South African identity will emerge. But until then, the old comrades of
the ANC are likely to shape the intelligence-reform process to their
benefit.
Lessons Learned
The South African case shows that intelligence-sector reform is a key
element of the democratization process. In the overall progression of
democratization, intelligence reform should begin earlier rather than
later. The South Africans developed a road map of where they wanted to
take these reforms through a White Paper, which outlined why reform
was necessary, what the intelligence-community structure would look
like, where the intelligence functions were to be distributed, to whom
the various agencies would be accountable, and how the agencies and
their personnel were expected to act. Working from this outline, South
African legislators crafted legal mandates to govern the operation of the
intelligence community, balancing security with transparency, estab-
lishing legislative oversight, building in civilian control, and separating
intelligence from policy making.
Operationalizing these mandates has proven to be harder than ex-
pected. Integrating, amalgamating, and transforming a variety of intel-
ligence agencies that were once mortal enemies into a cohesive and
efficient community is a long-term undertaking.  The professionalization
of the intelligence community is the key to success, and that aspect has
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been a struggle for the South Africans. It took several years to purge the
old-guard white “securocrats,” and it is likely to take quite a bit longer
to replace the Soviet-trained ANC group that is now in control. After a
two-year hiatus, the intelligence community late in 2002 established
the South African National Academy of Intelligence (SANAI) to pro-
vide training to members of the NIA, SASS, NICOC, and PSU as well as
the military’s DI and the SAPS. The graduates of the SANAI are the
future of the South African intelligence community, but it will be years
before they rise to the top.
A practical problem for most emerging democracies involves the
organizational dynamics of transforming a bureaucracy. One of the most
persistent arguments against reforming intelligence agencies is that the
transformation process will leave the nation vulnerable to both internal
and external threats. In most organizations, a radical transformation
process will inherently bring on a period during which the organization’s
efficiency drops. This certainly happened in South Africa. The goals
during the transformation process were to limit the decline in efficiency
while minimizing the time that it would take for the organization to
recover.
As a former South African senator has observed, a dilemma arises
when efficiency drops and seems to stagnate rather than improving to-
ward the level of the old organization. A common reaction to this
problem—intensified, in the case of intelligence agencies, by the real-
ization that they exist to counter what may be grave and urgent
threats—is to try to reorganize again specifically in order to improve
efficiency. The result, at least at first, will be yet another dip in perfor-
mance as the agency adapts to the latest round of changes. The problem
can become systemic if the agency’s leadership fails to grasp the rhythm
of the change-inefficiency-efficiency sequence and denies the organi-
zation sufficient time to adapt and gradually improve efficiency before
more changes are made. Consider that the South African intelligence
community underwent at least three major reorganizations in just over a
decade: first under de Klerk in 1989, then during the GNU period, and
finally after 2000 under Mbeki. In addition, most of the agencies en-
dured numerous internal reorganizations and amalgamations during the
same period. Unless the government gives these agencies time to adjust
and develop standing operating procedures, they are unlikely to reach
their optimal level of efficiency for a long time.
South Africa is the regional leader for the southern half of Africa, and
Mbeki served as the first president of the new African Union. At present,
South Africa neither faces any significant external threat, nor is it in-
clined to pose a threat to its neighbors. South Africa remains the key to
regional stability, and after a long period of apartheid-induced isola-
tion and the difficult process of internal political transformation, it is
beginning to take on more of a leadership role in Africa.
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South Africa has made a remarkable transformation of its security-
intelligence sector from what had clearly become an independent
security state during the later stages of the apartheid regime to a bureau
of domestic intelligence under the GNU. However, with the consolida-
tion of the ANC’s hold on power, the Mbeki administration has shown a
tendency to inch the security-intelligence services toward a political-
police mode of operation. Rather than being dominated by the military
“securocrats,” the new intelligence community is dominated by ANC
veterans—mostly trained in the former Soviet Union, East Germany, or
Cuba and virtually all with a history of common service in the ANC’s
intelligence wing during the long struggle against the apartheid re-
gime. The placement of so many key security-sector positions in the
hands of communist-trained former intelligence operatives is a remark-
able exception to the general trend in new democracies. The ANC’s
domination of the public sector calls into question the efficacy of gov-
ernmental-oversight mechanisms, particularly in the intelligence and
security sectors, and the potential emergence of a single-party state
does not augur well for democracy. How South Africa consolidates its
democracy is being closely watched by other emerging democracies,
and its relative success or failure will affect both the region and the
continent beyond.
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